Identifying class and ‘classifying’ identity in Paris 2005 and Ahmedabad 2002

Ipsita Chatterjee

Department of Geography and the Environment
University of Texas at Austin
chatterjee@austin.utexas.edu

Abstract:

Understanding violence is a major pre-occupation in social sciences and approaches to violence range from neoclassical perspectives, to regression models, to pure cultural analysis of difference. This paper attempts to understand violence by examining how class and identity positions are variously juxtaposed in different socio-spatial settings to produce contestations over the human condition. Through a comparative understanding of recent violence in two places—the riots of 2005 in Paris, France, and of 2002 in Ahmedabad, India—I indicate how class and identity overlap to produce fused realms of othering and violation. Through comparative analysis, I argue that in a globalizing world, class and identity will overlap in multifarious ways depending on the socio-spatial particularities of systemic exclusion. Therefore, studies of violence must move away from purely economistic and mathematical model building and instead move towards combining economic and cultural analysis.

Introduction

Understanding the roots of violence has been a common pre-occupation of academics. There is something in-human, all-consuming, and spectacular about
violent events that appeal to the rational faculties of humans in the same way as earthquakes and volcanoes do. The desire to understand and predict societal violence is in some way an attempt to understand the core of humanity itself. Hobbes’ ‘nasty, brutish man,’ Adam Smith’s ‘self-interested economic man,’ Durkheim’s ‘anomie’ all represent efforts to understand the socio-psychological basis of a violent society so that it can be better managed. Marx was the harbinger of hope, as he externalized the ‘dark side’ of humanity by explicating how violence was not inherent in human nature but, rather, was the result of a systemic production of inequality and hence injustice. Violence itself has shown no signs of subsiding—the contingency of peace is well established and academic efforts to understand violence continue unabated. There is a large section of literature grounded in sociology and economics that deploys rigorous regression models to understand trends and patterns of violence (DiPasquale et al., 1998; Olzak et al., 1996) and there are others who use rich ethnographies to provide vivid narratives of violence (Gregory, 2004; Kakar, 1996; Nussbaum, 2007).

Harvard intellectuals like Huntington (2002) and free market ideologues like Thomas Friedman (1999) conclude that globalization juxtaposes different people and culture in such an unprecedented way that ‘they’ are suddenly envious of what ‘we’ have—the root of societal violence therefore lurks in the inherently envious human nature of the have-nots. The globalized world, according to Friedman, is likely to be a violent world if it provokes so much envy. Others, like Chua (2003), recount that minorities that have traditionally dominated markets gain greater leverage through deregulation and liberalization ushered by globalization, and the impoverished majority reacts violently as the same processes of globalization bypass them. This paper argues that a comprehensive understanding of ethnic violence in the contemporary world requires an in-depth understanding of class and identity positions and how they are locally contextualized to define the contours of marginalization and dispossession. Using examples of urban violence from India and France, this paper attempts to critique analyses that exclusively rely on statistical models to generalize causes of societal volatility for all places and time. Instead, through a comparative analysis of two distinct events in two separate places, this paper explicates how class position and religious identity are deployed diversely to produce violent contexts. To this end, two case studies are used: (1) the 2002 riots in Ahmedabad, India, where over 2000 Muslims were killed, numerous women raped, and much property destroyed, and (2) the French riots of 2005, which was largely multi-ethnic with North African immigrants, blacks, and even white youth revolting against a system which has impoverished them through massive unemployment, racism, and deplorable housing conditions—the commonality of economic despair and identity annihilations transcending ethnic divides to produce an unified resistance (Murray, 2006; Ossman and Terrio, 2006).
A tale of two places

In 2002, a Hindu-Muslim riot broke out in Ahmedabad city in the state of Gujarat in India. The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), which has an overtly Hindu fundamentalist agenda, was in power in Gujarat and organized the riot against the minority Muslim community (Chenoy et al., 2002). The BJP has used a cultural nationalism discourse to stigmatize all religious minorities, particularly Muslims, as foreigners needing to be completely ‘Hinduized’ in order to be true Indians. With 9/11 and the subsequent demonization of Muslims, the BJP hoped to reconcile its sub-national discourse of ‘othering’ with a global discourse of Islamophobia to win U.S. friendship (Shah, 2002; Balgopal, 2002). Hindus and Muslims share a contentious relationship in India stemming from colonial policies of divide and rule, the violent history of partition, and the creation of Pakistan as an Islamic state. Hindu-Muslim conflict in post-independence India is, however, predominantly an urban phenomenon concentrated in certain cities. Ahmedabad, largely peaceful in the pre-independence period, became violence-prone predominantly in the 1980’s and 1990’s (Varshney, 2002), with the 2002 conflict being a benchmark event because of its intensity and longevity.

The riot was triggered by an incident in nearby Godhra, Gujarat, where two coaches of the Sabarmati express train were burned, killing 58 passengers, mainly women and children. Some of these passengers were supporters of the BJP. Although never proven, it was alleged that the coaches were burned by Muslims (Ahmed, 2002). The train-burning incident sparked a two-and-a-half month long riot during which members of the Hindu community, according to official estimates, killed 2,000 Muslims, or 5,000, according to un-official estimates. There was indiscriminate rape of many Muslim women, looting and burning of Muslim property with tacit support from the police and the state BJP government (Yagnik and Seth, 2002). The riot selectively destroyed Muslim businesses and property and displaced Muslim workers, who either migrated or remained unemployed for a long span of time. The economic, cultural, and built landscape has been completely altered, with sizable sections of the Muslim population still too scared to return to their destroyed businesses and property (Yagnik and Seth, 2002). Overnight, Hindu temples and roads have been built over Muslim shrines (Ahmed, 2002; Sarkar, 2002). Many riot-affected Muslims never returned to their original homes, and instead, re-settled in all-Muslim ghettoes that have emerged in the periphery of the city after the riots.

Once referred to as the “Manchester of India” (Breman, 2002), Ahmedabad had a large concentration of cotton textile mills. The mills were concentrated in east Ahmedabad, which was first to be industrialized and is inhabited mainly by a
poor industrial labor force comprised of Muslims and ‘low caste’ Hindus. East Ahmedabad is separated from the west by the river Sabarmati. The western city houses the mainly Hindu middle and upper middle classes (Mahadevia, 2002). The city has experienced a remarkable change of fortune since the Indian economy was opened to neoliberal policies in the late 1980’s and early 1990’s. The new policy, also referred to as the New Economic Policy phased out industrial licensing and quotas, requiring major re-structuring. Mills that could not restructure closed down (Kundu and Mahadevia, 2002). Eighty mills, the mainstay of Ahmedabad’s economy, have been closed since the mid-eighties. This resulted in the displacement of 100,000 workers, pushed into the informal sectors, competing for low-paid part-time jobs in unorganized manufacturing, hawking and vending, with incomes 35 to 45 percent below what they originally earned as mill workers (Breman, 2002; Kundu, 2000; Mahadevia, 2002). Neoliberal urban development plans also moved from providing cheap infrastructural facilities to building urban beautification projects, like the Green Partnership Program and Riverfront Development Program, resulting in the forced eviction of people from slums to ‘ready’ the city for foreign investors (Mahadevia, 2002).

Prior to the opening of the Indian economy, the textile mills and the labor union association served as public spaces for inter-community interaction (Breman, 2002; Varshney, 2002). In the days of industrial prosperity, therefore, the Hindus and Muslims of Ahmedabad shared a working-class bonding that enabled them to transcend inter-ethnic differences. With the closure of the mills and increasing unemployment and informalization, common class ties eroded. Disappearance of social interaction and an increasingly Hindu fundamentalist politics promoted by the BJP increased insulation between the communities. The worst killings and devastation in the 2002 riot happened in east Ahmedabad, home to the informalized urban poor belonging mainly to the Muslim and the ‘low-caste’ Hindu communities. Ganesh and Mody (2002) recount how the frustrated and unemployed Hindu youth of Ahmedabad, willingly participated in the killings when ‘motivated’ with money and alcohol provided by BJP’s political affiliates.

In November 2005, a couple of youths of Maghrebi ancestry died while fleeing police in the Parisian suburb of Clichy-sous-Bois, where 50 percent of the population is below 25 years of age. This incident sparked urban riots all over France prompting the government to clamp down and impose a curfew. The interior minister Mr. Nicholas Sarkozy referred to the dead as delinquent “scum” and vowed to “hose down” the suburbs (Maddox, 2005). He issued an order to

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2 The traditional Hindu social order is considered to be hierarchical where individuals are born into castes which initially represented their family occupation. The Brahmins or the priestly class occupy the top rung, followed by the erstwhile ruling class of kings and landlords, followed by the merchants and traders and lastly by the lower castes who carried out menial jobs like agriculture, pottery, weaving and a whole section of outcastes who performed ‘polluting professions’ like burning the dead.
deport all foreigners if found guilty of rioting irrespective of whether they are legal or illegal immigrants to France. The suburbs of Paris, where the rioting youth resided, are not akin to the green, posh, and sleepy spaces in the US. They are dreary post-war apartment blocks largely inhabited by immigrant North African and Asian populations. The suburbs are referred to as *les banlieues*, a term which originally signified spatialized poverty and marginality (Ossman and Terrio, 2006). The unemployment rate among immigrants in France is 26 per cent and can reach 40 per cent in these suburbs and, to gain access to other areas, they have to commute long distances. During the rioting, these marginalized youth destroyed their own neighborhoods. While the majority were North African, black, and Muslim, it was a combination of poverty and desperation that united them rather than color or creed (Murray, 2006).

This is a generation of youth who suffer from economic and ethnic marginalization. Globalization has led to the emigration of French factories, which once employed the parents of these youth. Lower employment prospect means competing with the white population for jobs, and the existence of institutional racism means very little possibility of acquiring alternative employment or any employment at all (Murray, 2006; Silverstein 2000). The riots exposed the desperation of this community in France, which is spatially ghettoized, economically marginalized, pushed into menial jobs, face untold police brutality and surveillance, and are continuously stereotyped by far-right ideologues dominating French politics. Rightwing ideologues view the ‘immigrant problem’ and the urban riots as a case of Huntingtonian ‘clash of cultures’ where immigrant Muslim traditions are an impediment to assimilation into superior French values. The rioting youths, on the other hand, want to be French, but are culturally and economically rejected, spatially marginalized, and institutionally policed. A post-Sept 11 world has created renewed hysteria about the threat of Islamic extremism brewing in these *banlieues*. The 2005 riots called the French model of integration into question.

**Analyzing violence**

Different approaches have been used to understand the causes of riots. A neoclassical perspective attempts to understand rioting within the rubric of cost-benefit analysis (Tullock, 1971), where the rioters are simply responding to the personal costs and benefits of rioting. Therefore, only individual self-interest (private costs and benefits accruing from riots) guides individual behavior (DiPasquale et al., 1998). Needless to say that while cost-benefit analysis may be a convenient way of accounting for ‘rational’ profit-maximizing behavior of entrepreneurs, it can hardly account for the social complexities of individuals in social totality, i.e. humans as parts of communities, groups, classes. In the strict economic sense, an individual French youth had little to ‘gain’ by destroying the infrastructure of the very suburbs in which he/she lived. A Hindu youth of
Ahmedabad also had no immediate gains in killing his/her Muslim neighbors other than small amounts of money and alcohol. Neoclassical economic models, however, acknowledge the importance of community level grievances like ethnic marginalization and police brutality, but the obvious contradiction in using community/societal level variables is the difficulty of reducing group/class/community gains to individual private gains. The micro-economic obsession with the objective individual’s self-interest assumes that it must be possible to dissolve all collective community level gains to individual benefits; otherwise the rational individual has no incentive in community participation. This contradiction is often resolved by assuming that individuals are (a) organized by leaders to riot for community gains, (b) peer pressure induces individuals to riot for the community, and (c) community level incidents become catalysts in provoking a shift from a non-riot to riot equilibrium. Community level variables chosen often include relative poverty of groups assuming that disparity in quality of life provokes anger, envy, and rioting behavior. Ethnic diversity is another variable assuming that ethnic minority choose to riot to gain a share of society’s resources. The neoclassical quest is therefore to understand what makes riots a rational choice for groups. Under this model, therefore, riots represent ‘rational’ acts—irrationality and fanaticism falling within the rubric of psychology, and hence outside the realm of the rational economic behavior of *homo economicus*. Extensive cross-country riot data are then used to run rigorous regression models between incidence/intensity of riots and GDP, ethnic diversity, and country’s population size, which act as community level variables. The conclusions often include broad generalizations like a positive correlation between population size and rioting, a positive correlation between ethnic diversity and rioting, or a negative correlation between GDP and rioting (DiPasquale et al., 1998). The problem with neoclassical approaches and/or strictly statistical methods is that they require the disciplining effects of a tunnel vision that can only ‘see’ within the framework of preconceived notions, and they also require strict controlling of those factors that cannot be represented within the pre-selected parameters.

Conversely, Touraine (1985), Melucci (1988) and Laclau and Mouffe (1985) adopt an identity approach to understand social conflict. They argue that post-industrial society is largely anti-modern. Conflicts are no longer played along class (economic) lines, but are defined by symbolic and cultural resources. Identity is the process through which actors construct meaning in places (Edleman, 2001), and differences between identities serve as sites for riots. Touraine argues that with a move towards a more postindustrial society, and with the failure of modernity to secularize or emancipate, the classic Marxist-structuralist analysis of struggle between labor and capital is now exhausted. Conflicts now emerge less in the realm of work and more in other settings of existence (Edelman, 2001). Postmodern conflicts are about cultural and symbolic differences based in the here and now. Identity position negotiated in particular places is already so valorized that any real
or imagined threat to the meanings constructed can become contentious. Dissolution of conflict and democratization of everyday life would mean recognition and affirmation of individuals and social groups who can then express themselves in social space. The social spaces are constituted through cultural and symbolic processes of signification. The valorization of identity, therefore, would involve the ability of individuals and groups to represent, signify, and project their world view within the existing system of signification. While the neoclassical approach generalizes the particularities of the human condition relying often on statistical indicators, the identity school emphasizes the cultural particularities of the human condition, emphasizing the spontaneity of identity positions. The problem with a purely identity approach is that it replaces *Homo economicus* with *Homo culturalis*, the former is overtly rational and predictable in its economic motivation towards rioting, while the latter is overtly spontaneous and unpredictable in its identification, signification and othering.

Gregory (2004), Graham (2004) and Chatterjee (2009) on the other hand, adopt a spatio-identity approach where space and identity are implicitly imbricated and violence implies a struggle over spatial imaginations and spatial morphologies to reclaim identities. In other words, violence is actualized not simply because of inherent differences in identity positions which become the cultural basis for stereotyping and othering everywhere and in all places, but rather, identity positions and identity differences are materially produced in diverse spatial contexts. Identity and identity difference therefore do not float in a vacuum to be generally deployed uniformly everywhere, but depending on the socio-geographic contexts of their emergence, identity positions crystallize variously, diversely, and multifariously. For example, a popular discourse of ‘othering’ Muslims in India involves branding them as “Pakistanis,” implying that they are ‘foreigners’ and because of their religion they should have migrated to Pakistan during the partition of India in 1947. In Britain on the other hand, the term “Pakis” is used to stereotype and ‘other’ all South Asians including Indians, Pakistanis, and Bangladeshis irrespective of their religion. The identity ‘Pakis’ or ‘Pakistani’ becomes a diverse cultural tool kit for identity violation depending on how and where they are spatially/geographical imbricated in what way. This tool kit loses its significance if dismembered from its spatial context—calling a Hindu Indian “Paki” in India will mean nothing. Therefore, unlike the identity school discussed above, the spatio-identity approach emphasizes the fact that identity and identity differences cannot be understood as spaceless, the materiality of their occurrence will determine what kind of imaginaries will be produced where, and how these imaginations will be crystallized in what kind of spatial morphologies. The *banlieues* of Paris, for example, represent a distinct spatial morphology of identity violation, other places will deploy other spatial morphologies to concretize identity violation. To illustrate the concept of spatial imaginaries and morphologies, Gregory (2009, 3) borrows Said’s “imaginative geographies” to explain how in the context of Palestine,
distance folds into difference to ‘perform’ geographies of exclusion by constructing a colonial imagination of the ‘savage’ other. Graham, also in the Palestinian context, explicates how Zionist attempts to annihilate Palestinian identity and vice versa, is achieved through “urbicide by the bulldozer”. Violence is actualized in depriving the enemy of their respective city-based existence. Chatterjee (2009), in the context of violence against Muslims in India, indicates that space in the form of everyday landscapes and borders become the morphological basis for identity annihilations. The spatio-identity approach is more contextual than the neoclassical approach by bringing out the particularities of violent environments and, because it imbricates space with identity, it concretizes the contours of identity violation better than Tourraine, Melucci and Laclau and Mouffe’s approach. Yet, the spatio-identity approach does not explicitly indicate how political economic questions like questions of socio-economic inequality, class exclusion, and economic marginalization are inflected with questions of identity, linguistic expression, religion, ethnic or race positions in producing violent geographies. Class and cultural violation, which Fraser (1995) effectively refers to as questions of redistribution (class) and recognition (culture) are complexly conjoined with space to produce violence. Therefore, the spatiality of violence—what processes produce what kind of violent conditions and where—cannot be completely understood without investigating the class-identity dialectic.

Thompson (1974) and Peet (2000) explain that class, under heterodox Marxism, is a socio-economic and cultural formation based on shared experiences of social, economic, and cultural exploitation. In that context, the “working class identity” is not a pre-given subjectivity adopted by labor when they are employed in the factory floor for a certain wage. Working class identity is a production-determined identity mediated through value systems, customs, and traditions (Peet, 2000) and expressed contextually in places. Gramsci (1971) indicates that class violence involves control of both means of production and means of symbolic production, thus producing conditions conducive for hegemony—family, church, and schools are socio-cultural institutions in civil society that produce class identity. Culture, therefore, is not a separate super-structural category, but part of the very structures that make class exploitation possible (Williams, 1977). Following Peet, Thompson, and Williams (1977), I attempt to conceptualize production of violence through juxtapositions of class and identity, particularly religious identity. In this paper, I compare and contrast the 2002 riots of Ahmedabad with the 2005 riots in the suburbs of Paris to understand how the combined contexts of economic (class) and cultural (religious) marginalization produce violent riots in two distinct urban spaces. Although, the rioters in Paris were multi-ethnic, Murray (2006), Ossman and Terrio (2006) indicate how extreme right wing discourses and sometimes even left wing and centrist discourses have dissolved and standardized the multiplicity of race and ethnic origins into ‘homogenous’ categories like ‘immigrants’ of ‘Muslim heritage’ who are
increasingly influenced by the threat of global Islamic terrorism (Ossman and Terrio, 2006, 11). Murray (2006) observes that American neoconservative discourses of September 11 and Islamic terrorism are easily transported and grounded in France through Huntingtonian ‘clash of civilization’ analogies, where the multiplicity of ethnicities, and the reality of race and class marginalization are overlooked to explain the riots as the menace of Islamic fundamentalism against western values. This paper, therefore, attempts to understand how class and religious identities are conjoined diversely in two different spatial contexts to actualize violence. The objective is to provide a more comprehensive understanding of violent environments than what is possible through a neoclassical model, or purely identity analysis, or the spatio-identity approach.

The Paris and Ahmedabad riots make for interesting reference points because of their similarities and differences. Both riots are grounded in social, cultural and economic contexts where Muslims represent an oppressed minority and simultaneously form the urban working class, and, therefore, class position and identity position are juxtaposed to produce local urban contexts of violence. Both riots are set in the context of a larger globalizing economy characterized by disappearing factories and formal jobs. Politically, the existence of rightwing exclusionary identity politics defines a discourse of othering in both cases. The differences that make the comparison complex and interesting is that the Parisian case happens in the Global North, while Ahmedabad in the Global South. The former has a history of being part of a colonizing power, while the latter has a history of being colonized. In the case of Paris, the riots were carried out by an oppressed minority, while in the Ahmedabad case, the riots were engineered against the Muslim minority. In spite of the differences in geoeconomic history and levels of development, both socio-spatial instances of violence indicate that class position and religious identity where deployed as dominant conceptual tools to draw the structures of urban exclusion that contributed to violence. It is this complex juxtaposition of socio-economic (class) and socio-cultural (religion) identity that form the logic for my comparative analysis. The manner in which class and identity get juxtaposed in those two places is, however, socio-spatially specific and often diverse. It is in gleaning out the similarities and differences in the exact nature of deployment of class-religious identity that we can conceptually grasp how and why violence happens where. I rely on newspaper sources and literature review to conceptualize the Parisian riots. The Ahmedabad case, on the other hand, is studied through extensive fieldwork.3

3 During fieldwork carried out in the summer of 2006, I interviewed 65 Muslims and 35 Hindus in Ahmedabad in their homes. All interviewees were from separate households and belonged to the adult age group of 20 and above. I interviewed more Muslims than Hindus because fewer Hindus were willing to discuss the 2002 violence. Muslims on the other hand were very willing and seemed to find solace in talking about their plight. The interviews were semi-structured and conducted on the basis of snowball sampling. The initiating contact for the Muslims in east Ahmedabad was provided by a Muslim auto-rickshaw driver, whose vehicle served as
Dispossessed classes and stifled livelihoods

The closed mills of east Ahmedabad stand in a state of neglect just like the incredibly beautiful Muslim minarets and arches, which now stand desolate and uncared for. The now closed mills were once the very places where the working class, both Hindus and Muslims, met and worked to weave the vibrant fabrics of what was the ‘Manchester of India.’ The intricate arches and minarets are representative of Muslim architecture unique to this city. The working class neighborhoods around the mills are now battle grounds dissected by paths that the inhabitants call ‘border.’ Hindus and Muslims live in separate blocks within the same neighborhoods, often sharing a common wall between their homes. They represent an industrial reserve army retrenched for over a generation. One Hindu inhabitant claimed: “When the mills were open, this place would buzz with activity, each home had at least one member working in the mills. We had a reasonable income, now life is a struggle.” The working class of east Ahmedabad are now a thoroughly informalized labor force, the generation of erstwhile mill workers are now unemployed parents, some too old to work, and others hawking and vending, pulling carts and repairing cars. The women stitch, make incense sticks and kites with the hope of supplementing a family income. The new generation has grown up in the midst of an economic struggle for existence, they have not known class solidarity, nor have they tasted formal employment.

The BJP employs its muscle wing, the Bajrang Dal, to identify Hindu youths in each neighborhood and give them some cash to start clubs where Hindu youths can get together and build muscles and intimidate the neighborhood the Muslims. Unemployed Hindu youth believe that the real enemy is the Muslim and not the local government. It is true that the local government does nothing to foster employment opportunities for the poor, rather investing in greening, cleaning, and beautifying west Ahmedabad where the rich live, yet the government is Hindu, it champions Hindutva ideology (Hinduness as Indianness) and is hence absolved by Hindu youth. When asked about the government’s reaction to these youth endeavors, one Hindu youth responded: “The government backs us a hundred per

transport for my interview process. The initiating contact for the Muslims of the west Ahmedabad was provided by the director of a local NGO. The initiating contact for the Hindu interviewees was provided by a local Hindu shop keeper. The names of all Hindu and Muslim interviewees have been changed to preserve their anonymity. While I largely rely on primary data for the Ahmedabad case study (I also use some secondary data), I only use secondary data source for the French case study. Since I do not adopt a neoclassical approach, which usually depends on the conformity of different data sources for accurate statistical results, the differences in the data sources (primary, secondary) are unlikely to hamper a comprehensive comparison, because the objective here is a qualitative comparison of the contextual deployment of class and identity discourses in two spatial settings, since qualitative methodologies are unencumbered by the rigidities of statistical significance, they allow sufficient latitude in terms of heterogeneities of data sources used. In fact, heterogeneities of sources add the nuance and depth that more positivist methods cannot. Since I do not aim to establish statistical significance behind my interpretations and conclusions, nor do I aim to establish a one-size fit-all generalized model for the occurrence of violence, the diversity of data and the primary reliance on secondary sources for the French case is unlikely to hamper an in-depth comparison.
cent when we teach the Muslims a lesson, like we did in 2002.” When asked why Muslims need to be taught a lesson, the Hindu youth replied: “They are always a problem, wherever they are. Look at any part of the world today, it is Muslims who cannot live peacefully, they breed profusely. They have connections with terrorists. We are simply doing what Bush did in his war on terror, only with greater success. They deserve to be attacked.” Most Hindu youth in east Ahmedabad are aware that rioting against Muslims will not better their lives and will not provide jobs. Indeed, Muslims are hardly competition in the job market. Most rich Hindus will no longer employ Muslims after the 2002 violence. Lack of gainful employment, closure of the mills, increased alienation between Hindus and Muslims, and local BJP Hindutva histrionics, combined with global Islamophobia, has fomented an aggressive religious identity, eroding all vestiges of inter-community class solidarity.

The Chief Minister of Gujarat State, Mr. Narendra Modi, the new Hindutva hardliner of the BJP, declared during the 2002 riots that the attack on Muslims was a case of Newton’s third law of motion: very action has a reaction (Times of India, 2002). He was referring to the mass killings as a ‘normal’ reaction of the Gujarati Hindus against the alleged torching by Muslims of the Hindu commuters in the Sabarmati express train. Even though widely accused by independent fact-finding committees and the media (Chenoy et al., 2002) for actively letting police and party members participate in the murder and mayhem, the BJP was re-elected in the Gujarat elections that took place after the riots. Most Muslims were too scared to vote. The Muslims lost formal employment when the mills closed down. Since then, most have resorted to informal jobs like, hawking and vending. After the 2002 riots many lost their homes or were too scared to return to their homes, and had to re-settle in the all-Muslim colonies built by NGOs in the outskirts of the city. Settling in the outskirts was damaging for informal occupations like hawking and vending because the inhabitants in these new colonies not only were deprived of their business networks, but were now also forced to commute for long distances that rendered business unprofitable. All-Muslim colonies like Siddiquabad represent post-riot landscapes of ethno-spatial segregation. One Muslim respondent refers to it as a ‘negative zone,’ where it is impossible to get telephone or electric connection without suffering intentional and prolonged delays. Where Muslims continued to live in east Ahmedabad after the riots, they are shut-off from the Hindu lanes by gates built by their Hindu neighbors. Common roads once separating Hindu and Muslim blocks are now referred to as ‘borders’ not to be crossed. It is impossible for a Muslim to buy a home in a posh neighborhood even if there is money. Builders put up billboards stating that no Muslim will be allowed to purchase homes in a new development. Children never gain admission in schools if they have Muslim names. Roads, flyovers and other important landmarks are stripped off their earlier Muslim names (Ahmedabad has a rich Islamic heritage,
originally founded by a Muslim ruler, Sultan Ahmed Shah) and are renamed after local Gujarati Hindu ideologues.

The 2002 riot was simply the climax in a long saga of class and cultural exclusion meted out to the Muslims in Ahmedabad. “We are like the ‘scum’ of Ahmedabad; they hate us because we are Muslims, it was not always like this,” remarks a Muslim respondent who remembers a day when the working class had sweated and toiled in the textile mills, drank tea in the same cafeterias and bargained within the same labor union association. In many ways the Hindus of east Ahmedabad are similar to their Muslim neighbors. They represent a now retrenched working class, who are economically marginalized by the local BJP government. The urban renewal programs in a post-reform neoliberal Ahmedabad are no longer geared towards developing cheap infrastructure, poverty alleviation, slum development, or re-thinking employment opportunities. Instead, they are directed towards planting trees in rich areas (Green Partnership Program), and reclaiming land from the bed of the river Sabarmati to built pent houses, water parks, hotels and office blocks to attract foreign business (Sabarmati River Front Development Program). The Hindus of east Ahmedabad predominantly belong to the Schedule Caste (SC) and Other Backward Classes (OBC) category, historically marginalized in the Hindu caste hierarchy by being forced into menial caste-occupations curbing all possibilities of social mobility. The government calls for affirmative action and reservation of seats for SCs and OBCs in government jobs, schools, yet in large spheres of social and political life the entry of SCs and OBCs in positions of importance are contested by Hindus in the upper echelons of the caste hierarchy. In the 2002 riots, the SC and OBC Hindus of east Ahmedabad were used by the local BJP government as ‘civil militia’ to produce violence (Shah, 2002). Like Muslims, the predominantly SC and OBC Hindus of Ahmedabad represent a cultural and economic grouping socio-spatially marginalized in the derelict districts of east Ahmedabad. Yet the Hindu working class possesses a ‘false consciousness’ stemming out of an ideological desperation to cling to power by vigorously professing their Hindutva to separate themselves from the true ‘wretched of Ahmedabad,’ the Muslims. Hindutva consciousness has replaced class consciousness because Hinduism is a survival strategy. The Hindu working class hopes to artificially separate itself from the Muslim working class to participate in the local and global discourses of Islamophobic othering. Although impacted by globalization and neoliberal reforms, east Ahmedabad cannot scale up globally. Ridden with bad roads, and densely packed with working class homes, Ahmedabad

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4 The census of India classifies certain castes as having historically suffered socio-economic discrimination and are accorded special status (reservation of seats in government schools, jobs). They are referred to as Scheduled Castes. The Other Backward Classes (or OBCs) in India are a group of castes officially recognized as having been traditionally subject to exclusion. The Constitution of India traditionally recognizes the need to extend positive discrimination (affirmative action) to this section.
cannot throw up call centers, nor can it become an information technology hub. It remains in the shadows of globalization. What is perhaps poignant about globalizing Ahmedabad is that the economics of deindustrialization, informalization and a deep entrenchment of class exploitation are juxtaposed with a cultural ideology of religious fragmentation. The hysteria of Islamophobia is used to re-invent a local minority as a global ‘other.’

The Paris riots of 2005 however, were not an attack on a minority, but, rather, an attack by a minority frustrated by systemic economic and cultural neglect. Like Ahmedabad’s derelict old mill districts, the suburbs of Paris represent a socio-spatial concentration of an urban industrial reserve army. While Ahmedabad’s working class settled around the mills in order to be in close proximity to their work place at a time when Ahmedabad was a growing textile city, the Parisian suburbs were created over inexpensive land outside the city to house immigrant labor and their families from erstwhile French colonies. Immigrant labor was first recruited from North Africa and later from sub-Saharan Africa. Male immigrants were invited as guest workers to supply a much needed work force for the poorly paid industrial and construction work in the booming French modernization projects between 1945 and 1975. After the 1960s, workers’ families were allowed to come over and settle in France through government sponsored reunification programs to help assimilate the worker into the French society (Ossman and Terrio, 2006). In both cases, the erstwhile working class suburbs housed a laboring class disciplined by formal employment in the Fordist factory systems. The 1980s signified a turning point. A new logic of free market reforms ushered an era of labor market and capital market flexibility. Capital could fly anywhere, especially to places where labor wages were much lower. French factories started taking their business to Tunisia, Slovakia and East Asia (Murray, 2006). Globalization therefore spelled an era of closing factories, rising unemployment and informalization in both places. Persistent unemployment and racial discrimination of the descendents of immigrants from the banlieues in other spheres of the job market have rendered the Parisian suburbs sites of hopelessness and poverty. Exploitation of an urban working class spatially excluded and socially marginalized formed the socio-spatial and socio-economic basis for despair expressed in the 2005 riots. In the Ahmedabad case, both Hindus and Muslims are working class, but because factories and labor unions have disappeared, common public spaces for inter-community interactions have disappeared. Shrinking of communal spaces for inter-community interaction, decline in economic opportunities, and increase in aggressive Hindutva politics have contributed to the erosion of class solidarity. Class exploitation proceeds unhindered through oppressive informal jobs, exclusion of Muslims from economic opportunities, and the local government’s general apathy towards employment generation and a systemic neglect of the urban working class rendering it structurally redundant to the city’s economy. Although both Hindus and Muslims face the brunt of class
exploitation, class consciousness disappears and is replaced by a growing religious identity politics that produces intra-class fragmentation, as demonstrated in the 2002 violence. In the Paris case, exploitation combines with racism to exclude people spatially, economically, and culturally. The exclusion then becomes the basis for violent retaliation. Regression models are too generalized to capture the human conditions of inequality imprinted in the micro-spaces of urban life.

Unclean identities and impossible assimilations

Both east Ahmedabad and the Parisian suburbs concentrate not only the poor, but also the ethnic minority—in case of Ahmedabad, the Muslim minority, and in case of Paris, a diverse group of communities representing erstwhile immigrant families. The rightwing ideology depicts a rabid Islamophobia, which is almost pathological in its similarities in terms of discourses of Frenchness/Hinduness. The BJPs are political parties in India that has national clout; it has substantiated its strongholds in the state of Gujarat through a rabid propagation of Hindutva. The affiliates of the BJP include the Vishva Hindu Parishad (VHP, ideology wing), which consists of higher caste Hindus, mainly Brahmins and Banyas (priestly and business caste); the Bajrang Dal (youth-muscle wing), consisting mainly of the ‘lower caste’ Hindus representing the foot soldiers; Durga Vahini (women’s wing of the Bajrang Dal); and Akhil Bharitya Vidhyarthi Parishad (Student’s wing). The Rashtriya Swayam Sevak Sangh (RSS), a self-help organization of volunteers representing the cultural affiliate of the BJP. The ideological gurus of the RSS, draw inspiration from Hitler’s blood and soil racism to concoct a home spun version of Hindutva cultural nationalism (Appadurai, 1973). Glowalker, one of the gurus of the RSS claim: “Germany has also shown how well-neigh impossible it is for races and cultures, having differences going to the root, to be assimilated into one united whole, a good lesson for us in Hinduism to learn and profit by…. the non-Hindu people in Hindustan (India) must either adopt the Hindu culture and language, must learn to respect and revere Hindu religion, must entertain no idea but the glorification of the Hindu nation” (Rauchaudhuri, 2000, 263). The BJP and its affiliates refer to themselves as the ‘parivar’ (family)—the parivar’s believes in a variety of cultural nationalism that questions the patriotism of all non-Hindu minorities. According to the parivar, therefore, the minority groups can never recognize India as their ‘holy land,’ because they must look outwards towards Mecca or Bethlehem for religious sustenance.

The idea is to usher a mythical golden age where Hinduism flourished in Bharatvarshya (India) uncontaminated by cultural invasion. The parivar thus ignores the fact that India because of its unique geography has always absorbed moving people and cultures (Masaoud, 1998; Subbarao, 1958). Rejuvenating the mythical golden age means reclaiming Muslim monuments, Hinduizing names of roads, bridges, cities, and landmarks (Raychaudhuri, 2000). Efforts were made to
change the name ‘Ahmedabad,’ which is drawn from its Muslim founder Ahmed Shah to a Hindu version called ‘Karnavati’ (Tribune, 2001). Apart from monuments and landscapes, the minority community also must be reclaimed through complete assimilation to Hindudom, they must shed completely their ‘foreign’ origins, and claim no special rights or favors. Golwalker in his book: *Our Nationhood Defined* states: “Emigrants have to get themselves naturally assimilated in the principal mass of the population, the national race, by adopting its culture and language and sharing in its aspirations, by losing all consciousness of their separate existence, forgetting their foreign origin” (Appadurai, 1973, 510). The assimilation strategy ignores the fact that minorities in India are largely Hindu converts, and that their ancestors had embraced Islam or Christianity in the past to escape caste discrimination rampant in Hinduism, therefore, they are neither ‘foreign immigrants,’ nor ‘invaders.’

In the post-September 11 world, this rabid Hindutva ideology has gained a new dimension where this ‘Muslim other’ is now also a ‘terrorist,’ and hence, assimilation strategy is considered too ‘soft’ by the Hindutva hardliners, who want to replace assimilation strategy with annihilation strategy—the victims of the riot claimed that un-official census of Muslim homes and businesses were conducted months before the riot, and irrespective of the train burning incident, Muslims would have been annihilated in Ahmedabad. Pravin Togadia, the then international general secretary for the VHP, claimed in the midst of violence: “It is necessary for India, Jews and the Western world to come together and fight Islamic militants (The Asian Age, 2002), and again on April 2, 2002: “What is happening in Gujarat is not communal riots but people’s answer to Islamic jihad” (Express India, 2002). A largely BJP led central government had passed the Prevention of Terrorism Act (POTA) in 2002. POTA allowed the detention of a suspect for up to 180 days, without filing charges in court. It also allowed law enforcement agencies to withhold the identities of witnesses and treated a confession made to the police as an admission of guilt. Under regular Indian law, a person can deny such confessions in court, but not under POTA (POTA, 2002). The Muslims in Ahmedabad claim that the police regularly pick up Muslim youth under POTA who are then made to stagnate in jails, the arrests increased manifold during the 2002 violence. POTA was also used as a scare tactic to prevent Muslims from lodging complaints against the Hindu rioters.

France represents an interesting parallel where assimilation strategy is an obsession—the British model of multiculturalism is shunned and criticized as a model, which produces a multitude of cultural, ethnic, and religious ghettos where immigrants lead their distinct lifestyles. In an attempt to deal with the ‘assimilation problem,’ when the French minister Sarkozy in the wake of 2005 riots called for a vision of “French Islam,” he was severely criticized by the then presidential hopeful (later president), Dominique de Villepin who stated that in the absence of a vociferous insistence on complete assimilation such models will create problems of
terrorism as in Britain (Maddox, 2005). France strives for a melting pot approach or *l’assimilation* as opposed to *communautarisme*. French zeal for *l’assimilation* ignores the immigrant working class of France being already forced to live in a multitude of ethnic ghettos outside the city. Being a French citizen, therefore, means being just French, not African French, or South East Asian French. Irrespective of the racialized reality of France, the assimilation strategy is based on the idea of theoretical equality of all citizens of the republic (Kimmelman, 2007), yet CVs with ‘foreign’ names routinely land in wastebaskets in spite of possessing requisite qualifications. Processes of naturalization and citizenship are imbued with cultural enquires about whether the aspiring citizen eats couscous, reads foreign newspapers, and frequently visits Morocco (Murray, 2006). State sponsored secularism manifests itself as anti-Islamic fundamentalism through aggressive suppression and policing of the immigrant cultural iconography where Islam is viewed as an antipode to Frenchness. The secularist imaginary, however, is heavily rooted in Judea-Christian Frenchness whereby the same state that supports churches and synagogues refuses funding and planning permission to mosques (Murray, 2006; Silverstein, 2000). Graphic and alarmist media reports portray congregations for Muslim Friday prayers as sensitive cul-de-sacs where a mass of people with flying banners and Koran kneel in prayer to Islamicize France. Overtly dramatic rendition of the ‘foreignness’ of Islam produce an image of the immigrant as the cultural ‘other’ simmering with envy and anger, politically volatile and violence prone. The normalization of Judea-Christian tradition as French, modern, and secular, therefore, creates its antitheses in the savage, violent, delinquent, backward, and headscarf-wearing Muslim symbolizing everything that France is not supposed to be. The head scarf incident that involved expulsion of a couple of students from French schools for wearing headscarves started an identity war between Islam, secularism, and Frenchness, where the state, schools, feminists, conservatives, and socialists attempted to redefine the public-private boundaries of secularism.

The 2005 violence was viewed as an integration problem, where the immigrant minority refused to surrender their identity and assimilate into French society. The then interior minister, and now president Nicholas Sarkozy, referred to the rioters as ‘scum’ and delinquent group of drug traffickers and thugs. The philosophical rightwing backed Sarkozy’s stance, many ascribed persisting poverty to the ‘polygamous’ nature of the Muslim immigrants and lamented that colonial history needed to be taught positively, where colonizers are to be depicted as uplifting the savages, others stated that there is hardly any connection between poverty and despair (Murray, 2006), implying that the riots were an identity problem and not a socioeconomic issue of class marginalization. The political and ideological rightwing called for stringent immigration laws, cultural purging, and strict surveillance to solve what they consider a national integration problem. The government in 2007 announced a DNA testing policy for immigrant families
Identifying class and ‘classifying’ identity

wishing to migrate to France, the policy calls for biological proof for immigration (Sandford, 2007)—genetics, therefore, joins a long list of other pre-existing discriminators like skin color, ‘foreign’ names, and Islamic iconography to help separate the grain from the chaff.

The Ahmedabad and the Parisian riots represent poignant cases of identity construction that excludes and annihilates by propagating an impossible cultural logic of ‘inclusion.’ The BJP imagines Hinduness as more than a religion, it is the cultural bedrock of Indianess that a Muslim cannot genetically possess. To be ‘included’ in the Hindutva imaginary would therefore mean a disciplined purging of everything non-Hindu in terms of name, religion, customs, traditions, festivals, food habits (Muslims must give up beef eating), symbols, language, and clothing. Assimilation means the creation of an empty subject who must be severed from his/her unique historicity to be filled with an imagined monolithic Hindu identity. This is an impossible project because Hinduness itself is contextual and diverse—Hindus in India are hardly monolithic, speaking different languages, following different customs, eating different food depending on their diverse socio-geographical contexts. The identity project of Hindutva is theoretical and concocted, and its realization will require the annihilation of history and geography itself. Because of its practical infeasibility, its political and cultural pursuit is bound to culminate in ethnic cleansings like, 2002 violence, because imperfect ‘others,’ the Muslims, can never reach the image of perfect assimilation that this model demands. The Muslims in Ahmedabad are Indian Muslims bearing many similarities with the Indian Hindus and many differences with the Saudi Arabian Muslims or the French Muslims—the socio-economic, socio-historical and geographical contextualities produce a people not very different from other groups, but the cultural project of identity construction is single minded in ‘identifying’ Muslimness as the singular dimension for identification.

The French model is not overtly religious, it does not aspire for a Catholic or a Judaic identity, rather, it is invested in secularism, aspiring only for Frenchness. Being French would mean not being a Muslim—one should do away with one’s ‘foreign’ habits, modes of eating and living. Frenchness becomes a racialized cultural tool that is used to ‘identify’ those who cannot fit-in. Muslimness acquires a monolithic visage when in reality the French working class is diverse, coming from different countries, possessing different skin colors, customs, food habits, and traditions. Their socio-historical contextualities must be annihilated to create a blank slate to be etched with everything non-Muslim. The French model of assimilation is theoretically based on progressive ideals of equality, where every French citizen must transcend narrow ethnocentric identities of religion, language, and creed to accept a common, homogenous, secular identity of being French. Unlike the overtly divisive and narrow Hindutva ideology, there may be something inherently good about unifying under a secular identity like, Frenchness—while Hidutva fragments Indians on the basis of religion, Frenchness at least theoretically
promises equality to all French citizens irrespective of race or religion. In practice, however, Frenchness economically, socially, and culturally segregates the ‘immigrant’ working class in the banlieues. There is no a priori pristine Frenchness, and there is no ‘true’ Hinduness, similarly, there is no pristine Muslimness or blackness, attempting to identify them and socially engineer them, becomes the first step towards production of violence. Therefore, identifying such identity politics, pointing out the impossibilities of such assimilation projects, and comparing such attempts in diverse places becomes academically important in understanding how identity is used as the cultural logic for violence.

**Conclusion: Class-identity juxtaposition and violence**

In spite of striking similarities in the manner in which cultural, socio-spatial, and economic exclusion proceeds in Ahmedabad and the suburb’s of Paris, there exists a stark contrast. While the 2002 violence in Ahmedabad was a case of riots against the Muslim minority, the 2005 riots of Paris was a case of minority rising in revolt. In both cases, the riots were sparked by a spontaneous incident—death of youths in the hand in the Parisian case, and alleged burning by Muslims of coaches of the Sabarmati express train in the Ahmedabad case. Spontaneous incidents lend an aura of unpredictability to violent events, yet they are usually the last straw that breaks a camel’s back—long process of sedimentation of economic and cultural neglect combines in volatile ways to promote ‘spontaneous’ incidents of violence. The Parisian situation is relatively easy to analyze—disenchanted working class frustrated and humiliated by class exploitation and identity marginalization (race and religiosity combined) lashes out against the system. The Ahmedabad case is more complicated, here the Muslim minority is juxtaposed as a working class along with the Hindu working class sharing common contexts of unemployment, informalization, and poverty, yet, the Ahmedabad violence is not a case of poor revolting against the system, class solidarity is absent and the working class as a whole is deeply cleaved by religious identity. A history of working class solidarity, shared position as the caste ‘other’ and the religious ‘other’ fade in the face of creatively constructed identities like Hinduness, Muslimess and the ‘terrorist.’

In terms of the reality of the human condition, being an SC, OBC Hindu in east Ahmedabad is not very different from being a Muslim there. Yet local rightwing ideology produces false consciousness in the urban working class by separating the SC, OBC Hindus from their Muslim counterparts. The immigrant suburbs of Paris are mixed as well. The erstwhile immigrants came from different countries, bringing with them a socio-geographical uniqueness. But the Parisian suburbs did not witness intra-class conflict along national/ethnic lines. Does the case of France and Ahmedabad, therefore, indicates that religion, as an identity factor, is an ultimate unifier, and that those ideologues that can successfully maneuver religious identities can strike gold in terms of divide and rule strategies?
It could be said that the BJP and its parivar have ingeniously penetrated the imagination of the Hindu working class to successfully produce amnesia about the bygone days of class solidarity and engineer a religious pogrom that divides Ahmedabad’s poor. By the same logic, in Paris, because the working class in the suburbs experience uniform discrimination resulting from their immigrant status, and because the rightwing ideologues with a broad homogenous brush ‘identify’ them as belonging to ‘Muslim heritage,’ one could say there is a solidarity and cohesion in the class-identity based revolt of 2005. But such an analysis is very Huntingtonian, based on a very limited conception of humanity, one that conceives humans as one-dimensionally rooted in religiosity. Religion is a potent identity no doubt, but it is only one dimension of what makes up the human conditions of everyday existence. History is replete with examples of intra-religious fights, and also examples of inter-religious solidarities. The French and Ahmedabad case comparison is not an attempt to provide the one formula that can explain what makes peace or conflict possible everywhere in the world. Rather, it indicates that class position and identity positions are important variables, which are galvanized in socio-spatially particular ways to produce violent contexts. Excluding class exploitation from an analysis of violence will lead us to a Huntingtonian abyss, where identity grievances appear as un-mediated by socio-economic deprivation. On the other hand, excluding identity analysis may lead us to a neoclassical abyss of economic variables mechanically correlated with incidents of violence. This paper is, therefore, an attempt to demonstrate how diverse juxtapositions of class and identity in different socio-geographical contexts produce multiple contours of violence. In these diverse socio-spatial juxtapositions, class can overlap with identity to become a potent unifying identity like in the Parisian suburbs, and class may be undercut by religion to divide people, as in Ahmedabad. It is rather easy and simplistic to explain violence as a manifestation of the nasty, brutish human nature being played out in neat ‘fault lines,’ which can then be modeled through regression equations, categorizing society into dependent and independent variables. When violence happens, class-identity nexuses become sites for contestation over the human condition, which are continuously mediated over space. Examining all moments of such contestations can provide a deeper understanding of the multiple topographies of violence.

References


