Migration Policies and Practices in Greece: Room(s) for Activism?

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In this brief paper I intend to discuss possible aspects of activism in the landscape of the gray and combustible zones of migration in a Greek city and two borderlands, as well as different imaginings and practices of activism that have taken shape, particularly in the context of contentious local spaces and politics challenging a defining characteristic of the nation-state, the power to govern the legitimate means of movement. For those who attempt to think and act, as if these are two separate categories, spaces of possible reflection, such as this publication, remain valuable and refreshing, for their perceived function as ex-otic, where taking a distance (from the apparitions of the self as well) is possible. The Evros and Igoumenitsa borderlands, as well as the city of Thessaloniki, will be my case studies.

An Oxymoronic Background of Migration and Border Policies and Practices

Greece’s location at the gates of the Schengen territory and the common EU external territorial border further increases its degree of responsibility in the scope of the EU’s asylum policy and the so-called “Dublin System”, according to which the first state through which an asylum-seeker has first entered the common EU territory is the one responsible for examining the refugee’s claim. The emphasis on control and surveillance remains an enduring trend in the formulation of the European Union’s Integrated Border Management model, where the predominance of national actors constitutes the rule (Bigo and Jeandesboz, 2009). “Proposals are

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mainly concerned with intensifying the surveillance of EU borders, and seem to lead to an upsetting of the current repartition of competences in relation to border management in the EU, between the member states and the Community. In the process, they also further marginalise considerations of the fundamental rights and freedoms of individuals, which should lie at the heart of EU preoccupations’ (Jeandesboz, 2008, 4). Greece has constituted the main entry point during 2010 and 2011 for over 90% of migrants without travelling documents trying to cross to Europe, while the living conditions in the undocumented migrants and refugee detention centres, especially in the Aegean Sea islands, Thrace region and the police departments throughout the country, remain unacceptable and degrading for human dignity, as depicted by a long list of international and national organizations (Syrri, 2010). After a fact-finding mission in October 2010, the UN Special Rapporteur on Torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, Manfred Nowak, highlighted the systematic detention of undocumented immigrants and asylum seekers in the country and concluded that “none of the detention facilities for migrants I have visited can be regarded as complying with international minimum standards for humane treatment of detainees”. For years the international organisations have been confirming the severe lack of adequate reception conditions for asylum seekers and refugees and evidence of conduct of “border control practices” that are not compatible with the principle of non-refoulement (according to which no state can expel a refugee to the frontiers of territories where his/her life or freedom would be threatened). Furthermore, Greece continues to be amongst the EU member states with the lowest recognition rate of refugees in the entire EU (very close to “zero’”), which is striking in light of the high volume of entries by nationals from countries identified as major sources of refugees by the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR), such as Afghanistan, Iran, Somalia and Palestine. According to UNHCR the recognition rate of refugees at first instance during 2009 was only 0.04% (11 out of 30,000 applications).

The Greek-Turkish land borders in Thrace, at the northeastern part of Greece and the southeastern part of the European Union, are an important point of entry for irregular migrants travelling from Africa or Asia to Europe via Turkey and Greece, as geographically this is the first member state border that they encounter. This border has made the headlines both in Greek and European media and has attracted NGOs’ and authorities’ attention because of the major challenges regarding the routine detention and treatment of all irregular migrants, the unsuitability of the overcrowded, insalubrious reception/detention centres, the lack of interpreters and of information for people wishing to seek asylum and the impossibility of irregular migrants to file an asylum claim if they wished. The Greek-Turkish land border is marked by the river Evros/Meric/Marica, and was heavily militarized because of the tensions between the countries. Migrants’ clandestine crossings started in the 1980s, yet until recently western Thrace was not a major entry point. The river waters coming from Bulgaria in the north are dangerous and the river often floods the surrounding areas. Fishermen and hunters often found bodies of drowned
people, while the presence of soldiers and mine fields on both sides made the crossing even more difficult. The Greek authorities in the past have been accused of illegal removal operations that are violating important human rights of the migrants involved: people would cross the border irregularly, be apprehended by the Greek border guards, be sent to a barrack, spend there the day and at dusk would be put back into dinghies in the Evros river and sent towards Turkey without them having ever given their identity data and/or have had the opportunity to seek asylum in Greece. Such practices have been common in the past years, yet since 2009 unconfirmed information suggests that such unofficial and actually illegal removal operations have been stopped. Irregular migrants arriving via the Evros border have been increasing steadily in recent years as the Greek side of the border has been de-mined. Migrant smuggling at this border is organized both through unguarded points, but also through major border stations where smugglers arrange the crossing in trucks and cars.

Thrace, as other borderlands, is a historical construct, related to state histories, impregnated with sedimentations of social meanings and power relations, as well as an assemblage of identities, narratives, discourses, policies and practices of supranational, national and local actors. The nation states are present here, in our case Turkey and Greece, in an area only recently demilitarised and reportedly de-mined, characterised by binaries of inclusion and exclusion such as Muslim/Christian, by perceptions and categorisations of ethnicity, large scale poverty and migration in the 1950s and 60s, yet also presently it constitutes the border space of water diplomacy, cross-border cooperation and home to a Euroregion. The border guard is also here, Greek and European, and on the other side of the demarcated line, Turkish, FRONTEX is somewhere in between, in its mission of interception and arrest of migrants, yet also mediation and education of local police forces on and upon the border. The Council of Europe is also here in its supervisory, humanitarian and civilizational role, human rights NGOs are here, international such as Amnesty International, national such as the Hellenic League for Human Rights, the Lawyers’ Group on Migration from Athens, Médecins sans Frontières, social movements networks such as No Border, yet no local civil society, as the region is still dominated by memories and practices of national consolidation. Migrants in their thousands are also here, crossing the border at night, arrested or swiftly carried away to Athens in smugglers’ cars via the Egnatia high speed corridor, visible only for a few minutes when arrested, carried in groups to the detention centres, some of which are located in the centre of the villages, some in the countryside periphery, maybe for a few hours while waiting for the train to Thessaloniki and Athens with their deportation papers in hand, visible to the police, yet imperceptible to the local population which largely prefers to ignore their presence. Discourses on the uncontrollable flows of Afro-Asians flooding the river, of fear for health, security and comfort, merge with discourses of human rights violations, suffering and pain. Thus Evros is the national border, part of the discursive landscape of a perpetual nation-building process and nationalist
practices, yet also a technical landscape of control in the new international context of flows of people, part of the control and surveillance infrastructure.

The Gray Zone of Illegality Inside the Cities

Coupled with the economic crisis, the situation in Greece is close to the breaking point. Estimates bring the number of irregular migrants to between 400,000-600,000. There is less work than ever for migrants, even on the black market, leading to reaction. The outstanding case of migrants’ activism (see Lafazani’s article in this volume), was the beginning of 2011 hunger strike by three hundred undocumented immigrants who came to Athens and Thessaloniki from Chania in Crete in late January demanding legalisation for all migrants. The Greek media contributed to a rising feeling of insecurity among Greek citizens who saw the centre of Athens “once again occupied” by “illegal migrants” and who feared that the overall issue would lead to violent clashes between extreme left-wing and extreme right-wing groups with the police in the middle. This hunger strike raised the question of whether migrant organisations and other civil society actors involved have exhausted all other means of pressure on this government. Given the very tight nexus between undocumented migration and asylum seeking in Greece, the government currently in power is forced to take for the first time concrete steps towards addressing important immigrant integration issues (the citizenship law reform in March 2010) and asylum policy (the law was passed on 27 January 2011). Greece is a country where for the first 10 years of her legal stay a migrant has to keep renewing her permit every 2 years by proving that she is legally employed as a full-time worker (about a quarter of the GDP is estimated to be produced in the informal economy). This is a heavy burden on the shoulders of migrant workers and their families who, if they fail to prove a high enough income, see the permit of their spouse annulled.

The tension can also be felt in the rise of racist incidents in Greece. There is now systematic violence against migrants in towns around Greece. The situation is aggravated by the economic crisis and the fact there is no work anymore so there are large numbers of migrants just hanging around. Difficulties in adopting and implementing legislation on the integration of migrants are demonstrated in the case of the Naturalisation Law in Greece. Proposals for a new law were submitted to the political parties in November 2008 but there were riots in December and no time to deal with it then. Then there were elections in September 2009. After the elections the Prime Minister was interested and a Commission was formed. The law was passed in March 2010, a great improvement on the former, anachronistic law and much better than the average in the EU. There is also an implementation committee to monitor its implementation, turning the *jus sanguinis* former practice into a *jus soli* procedure. However, two provisions of the new law have recently been declared anti-constitutional by a section of the Court: 1) automatic right to nationality for persons born in Greece who have studied at a Greek school for 6 years, and 2) the provision giving migrants restricted rights to vote in local elections.
Room(s) for Activism

However, the discourse of and on human rights focuses on suffering and pain, often obfuscating possibilities for activism and political action, by citizens of the countries involved as well as by migrants themselves. At the same time, the impact of the work of certain international non-state actors, such as UNHCR or the Conseil d’Europe, with its Comité pour la prevention de torture, exerting pressure on governments, has to be examined in the context of power relations amongst international, national and local actors. Furthermore, there are significant differences between the international organizations, part of the world-wide governance system, from that of NGOs and movements developed as part of social movements.

The approach taken by Papadopoulos and Tsianos (2006), tracing the political implications of the notion of imperceptibility in relation to migration and its role in the emergence of new modes of cooperation and action, is of importance here. Starting from a discussion of the notion of nomadism, they argue that “nomadism's dictum ‘you never arrive somewhere’ constitutes the matrix of today's migration movements”, while they delineate various modes of nomadic becoming which govern migrants’ embodied experiences: becoming animal, becoming women, becoming amphibious, becoming imperceptible. According to Papadopoulos and Tsianos (2006), the autonomy of migration is an imperceptible force which renders the “walls around the world” irreversibly porous, confronting today's configurations of political sovereignty, as these volatile transformations escape the ubiquitous politics of representation, rights, and visibility:

Instead of being perceptible, discernible, identifiable, current migration puts on the agenda a new form of politics and a new formation of active political subjects whose aim is not a different way to become and to be a political subject but to refuse to become a subject at all ... How does migration open possibilities for rethinking the end of contemporary forms of sovereignty? The politics of representation and its subversive re-articulations belong to the inventory of the historical realization of democratic social organization. Its core principle is national sovereignty, the ideal correspondence and congruence of people and territory. National sovereignty attempts to establish this correspondence in two subsequent moments: First, it separates and classifies the people of a territory into groups and social strata through the signification procedures of representation; second, it assigns rights of participation to each of these represented groups. National sovereignty is based on the national social compromise between different groups and strata for a potential egalitarian distribution of rights. Migration is part of this process, even if it was treated differently in different countries.

(Papadopoulos and Tsianos, 2006, 86)
Inside the Border Detention Centres

Testimonies come from field work in November 2009, February and August 2010 inside the detention centers at the Kiprinos Fylakio (guard post) (Orestiada–Evros) and Venna, which are under the authority of the border guard station in Sapes (Rodopi), the detention centers at Tihero, Soufli, Ferres and Isaakio (Evros), and the abandoned detention center in Peplos (Evros), as well as interviewing local actors, such as members of the police forces, lawyers, religious and local authorities, NGOs, activists and citizens in the region. At the same time there is already an abundance of reports and documentation by IOs and NGOs on the conditions of detention, as a range of international actors monitor the situation, starting with the CoE Committee for the Prevention of Torture, the relevant EU Commissioners, Amnesty International and Médecins sans Frontieres. Already there have been interventions by social movement groups – the Thessaloniki located No Border network organised actions at the Venna and Kyprinos detention centres. Media, local, national and international, from Al Jazeera to a Norwegian TV channel and the main Greek newspapers, cover the deaths, the atrocities, the competing desires to repel and to protect, as several topics key to representation and claims politics.

The functioning of the detention centres is linked to the possible reactions of the local communities and election politics. The Peplos detention centre was shut down because the local residents complained that its lack of sewerage caused an obnoxious smell. The deputy Prefect of northern Evros reported that it has been decided for the Tyhero detention centre to be moved to Fylakio, but the plan was cancelled due to local residents’ reactions (HLHR Report, 2009). In most detention centres of the Evros region, the local Prefecture takes responsibility for catering, the supply of basic hygiene materials, as well as disinfection and cleaning in some centres. It does so by contracting these tasks out to local businesses and organisations. However, in most cases the Prefecture is not reimbursing the businesses that carry out their contractual duties from their own funds. There are many cases where the Prefecture has not cleared its debts to local businesses after a year. As a result, many of these contractors/suppliers face bankruptcy and the detention centre’s conditions deteriorate even more as time goes by. Lacking basic items of personal hygiene for the detainees (e.g. bars of soap, nappies, toothbrushes, toothpastes, and serviettes) is a common problem that police authorities are confronted with. In the Tycho centre there are no showers or taps in the families’ ward. Broken pipes spraying water are used instead for this purpose right outside the sole existing toilet. “Toilets? A mess … I cannot send the poor woman [the cleaner] to clean that”, as the officer in another detention centre in Evros characteristically described the situation. Responsible for the cleanliness of the wards are the detainees themselves (usually with a plastic bin bag as a sole “cleaning” material) according to the rules set in various detention centres. Images of dirty water from toilets reaching out to beds and mattresses where men, women, children and babies sleep are characteristic of the sanitary conditions of most
centres. The cost of detention is high; the cost in drugs only at the detention facility of Venna in the Rodopi region was estimated at 500-600 Euros per month according to the general practitioner working in the centre until recently. The cost of food per detainee ranges in different centres from 5.8 Euros per detainee per day (a minimum cost set by Greek law for prisoners in the early 1980s) to nearly 7-8 euros when the Prefecture takes responsibility. The latter is a clear indication of overpriced contracts between prefectures and local catering businesses. In Thrace some local authorities would give a figure of up to 11 Euros per person, yet “the local super markets providing cleaning items have not been paid for months”, as another office reported.

Migrants’ agency and activism rarely become visible in reports, nor of the state, the EU or the NGOs. Yet during interviews, it becomes very obvious that migrants talk about their “smuggling” in a much more informed way than police, able to enumerate the different itineraries and relevant prices, the different stories they tell when interrogated and asked to declare their identity, the ways these answers become tools for different entitlements and resources, the ways choices are made. Indicatively, the recent uncovering of the story of mass graves in Evros to the media and the NGOs was skillfully negotiated and promoted to the media and the activists by migrants who had passed from the area, and had either managed to leave Greece or placed themselves in sort of secure positions. Migrants often protest within the detention centres, protests which often go unreported by the media. During research within the Fylakio detention centre a minor Afghani bluntly announced the plans of the young detainees to hold a hunger strike over detention conditions, and most importantly for them, the uncertainty of when they would be released, the fact that

There are no rules and procedures, no order here. Some of our friends, with whom we arrived at the same group and were arrested with us, were released days ago. Why are we kept here? Who decides? The prison warden, the chief of the police, the judge? Nobody informs us as to what will happen to us when we are taken away from here or released. We are going to go on hunger strike to demand our rights. Or we will eat broken glasses from the electricity bulbs. And if we die, at least we will help the others.

The long journey adds to the determination, “I want to go to Britain to study. I have family and friends there; indeed I am sixteen, but I came here all the way from Afghanistan, even much younger ones do; what makes you think that I will not make it to London?”

Finally there are two main exit points from Greece, the ports of Patras and Igoumenitsa, where conditions are also horrible as regards available infrastructure, legal possibilities to claim asylum, conditions for minors, hygiene, detention, while people squat in shacks, sleep under the high way corridor tunnels or on the mountain slopes waiting for the opportunity to hide under a lorry and be
transported to Italy. Since the demolition of the migrant camp of Patras, Igoumenitsa has now become an important exit point, where various migrant settlements are to be observed. From the beginning, incidents such as beatings and racist attacks were very often. In the past months however, the situation has worsened so much that shootings and even a case of death were reported. In particular, a Kurdish migrant was severely injured by a local, who shot towards five migrants nearby the port of Igoumenitsa. Ever since, the number of attacks towards the migrants has increased, especially after the local was arrested. Otherwise, migrants have been exposed to racist violence as they dwell in places where they are easily found and attacked, such as the forest around Igoumenitsa or under the bridges of Egnatia highway. Migrants spend their day in those settlements of their own making, waiting for the nightfall, when they reach the port and search for trucks or other vehicles travelling to Italy to jump into and hide. When they are found they are often beaten and arrested. Yet during the recent months more local and national organisations are becoming involved, taking on legal cases, providing shelter, organizing against the bulldozing of the settlement at Ladohori mountain.

For Aihwa Ong and Stephen J. Collier (2004), in an ever-shifting landscape shaped by the flows of markets, technologies, and populations, we are moving beyond the citizenship-versus-statelessness model. First, the elements of citizenship (rights, entitlements, etc.) are becoming disarticulated from each other, and becoming re-articulated with universalizing criteria of neoliberalism and human rights. Such “global assemblages” define zones of political entitlements and claims. Second, the space of the “assemblage”, rather than the national terrain, becomes the site for political mobilizations by diverse groups in motion. In the EU zone, unregulated markets and migrant flows challenge liberal citizenship. In camps of the disenfranchised or displaced, sheer survival becomes the ground for political claims. Thus, particular constellations shape specific problems and resolutions to questions of contemporary living, further disarticulating and deterritorializing aspects of citizenship. So how can the migrants themselves be active within the circulation of symbolic and material goods within a global context that seems to hinder them on all fronts from doing exactly that? Is it possible to describe the relationship between the constraints of the so-called global world and the individual and social aspirations of the new migrants? Which are the strategies, rationales, hopes, dreams, and fantasies that new migrants bring along: of being heard, of being recognized, of having a say, of having a hand in choosing their own lives by giving one’s time, effort, attention, and hard work. When real participation is denied, migrants turn to symbolic action and to reinvention of the self to rework their worlds and to obtain a sense of control in an unaccommodating environment. For Saba Mahmood (2001), agency is the capacity to act within historical relations of power. Following her, if one accepts that the exercise of social agency is only possible by persons and things that are part of social relations and brought into social networks, one has to interrogate the contexts within which particular things and persons find themselves able to effect changes in the social world. Mahmood
suggests that rather than thinking about agency as resistance, one should focus on how it is a capacity for action that is enabled and created by historically specific relations of subordination.

**Inside the Cities**

Standing out as a rare case, the Refugee Reception Centre in Thessaloniki is the only temporary structure hosting refugee families since 2000 in the city. In February 2010, the Greek Ministry of Health stopped the funding of the shelter, and the previous administrators (a proven to be corrupt NGO) left. About 80 refugees, parents with minor children, were in danger of being left out in the street and the city would lose the only accommodation for asylum seekers. However, the refugee centre remained open and functioning for months as an open, self-organized hosting facility, as the city and migrants decided to keep the shelter open in a meeting of the tenants and civil society who took over the management. With the support of the anti-racism initiative, voluntary work and material support from hundreds of citizens and social organizations, particularly the self-organization of its own residents, the centre did not only not close but became a practical model of social solidarity. Refugees and asylum seekers made their presence felt in space, managing their own home and establishing links in the neighborhood and with other organizations as they actively participated in activities all over the city. Would that be an example of self-organisation, solidarity practice and agency amidst adversary policies?

The relation between migration and the border is exemplified much more clearly in the ways migrants occupy and transform urban space after their arrival to Greece (such as the camps in Patras and Igoumenitsa), the ways they impact local economies, the ways they negotiate, or not, their right to exist with often hostile local communities, even when locked up in detention centres visible in the neighbouring area and the ways they translate state policies and practices even at the most severe échelles of border crossing, the detention centres. It is, therefore, of importance to examine the key role space plays in contentious politics, especially in dense conjunctures, such as detention centres and migrants shelters, particularly when self-organized. Because it is such an invaluable resource, both for transgressive mobilisation as well as for the “maintenance of order”, space typically becomes a central – though often implicit – bone of contention. As far as the clandestine migrant-claimants are concerned, the stakes primarily involve the active construction of milieus, fomenting the kind of collective effervescence required for collective-action. Engraved within the histories of past transformative experiences, in spite of police surveillance, such politically propitious locales facilitate communication by compressing time-distance, thus thickening group interaction and concretising the moral imperatives of collective action against the backdrop of burgeoning solidarity, while also contributing to the – more long-term – emergence of protest cultures of resistance.
It is important to stress, however, that space is not an “independent variable” – a “mere structure” obtaining effects independent of human agency. Although obviously inherent in every form and aspect of mobilisation, space is eminently “constructed” (and subsequently “imagined”) by deliberate effort undertaken both before and during the time of the actual detention. Before space can serve as a resource for agency and mobilisation, migrants have to actively invest it with cognate meanings, wresting it from rival representations and framings. This interaction between spatial actors/action and space, however, must be approached dynamically: influence runs both ways. On the one hand, space can become a collective action resource if and only if spatial action is undertaken; on the other hand, for this action to bear fruit space itself is a prerequisite. The asylum seekers’ shelter in Thessaloniki has been supported by Meeting Point of the Migrants, another initiative, drawing closer a range of collectivities, often in concrete action, such as theatre performances, language courses, solidarity actions, organised discussions, antiracist festivals, fending for finances through the organising of an eating place, and more. Among others, those actions include the consolidation of spatial habits, however informal or loose: the formation of spaces of social interaction and encounters, where members carry on their discussions about future plans, participation and representation of group claims when outside researchers and reporters appear, etc. Those spatially determined routines house and nurture the dense political communication on which a contentious culture is based. The interaction of spatial actors/actions and places is bidirectional. Space is constituted as a resource through the assumption of spatial actions, but a condition for those actions to avail is space itself. The impact on the city is of importance, too, as a series of networks have been mobilised, sensitising awareness, forging solidarity, raising questions, forming alliances and mobilising, as happened during the migrants’ hunger strike in Thessaloniki. The influence on other actors has been visible too, i.e., the lawyers’ association has been involved; while the response of the local authorities remains to be seen.

An exclusive focus on progressive contestation, though, leaves a gap in broader empirical understandings of activism in the framework of neoliberalism, as it neglects the conservative, exclusionary and ethnocentric reactions, which for many offer an appealing alternative to more inclusive and anti-racist forms of resistance. Scholars have theorised activism and progressive local contestations to neoliberalism, yet there has been only passing reference to an ethnocentric and reactionary potential for resistance (Leitner et al., 2007, 12; Harvey, 2005, 81-6), as not all contestations may lead to progressive futures. The rapidly increasing sprawl of racist and xenophobic attacks against migrants in Greece during 2011 and the present Greek ethnocentric anti-immigration (re)actions can be seen as locally scaled acts of contestation to neoliberalising policies formulated at the national and supranational scales that have had (or are interpreted as having) the (un)intended consequence of fostering “illegal” immigration. Perceiving themselves at the frontlines of a rescaled national boundary, these locally scaled anti-immigration activities (and/or policies) represent attempts by local governments and residents to
“take matters into their own hands” by rescaling a defining characteristic of the nation-state – power over immigration enforcement – in order to regulate undocumented migration. This emerging local politics of rescaling presents a serious challenge to what has long been considered a defining characteristic of the nation-state, the power to govern immigration, or in sociologist John Torpey’s words, the “monopolisation of the legitimate means of movement” (2000, 3).

Subnational governments are usually prevented from making immigration policy, although they are able to develop policies that address the integration of migrants into local communities. However, in Greece currently, both in Athens and in Thessaloniki, the issue arises whether the city has the power to authorise discrimination on the basis of a resident’s noncitizen status or, that is, to create and enforce locally scaled migration policy. This would constitute an attempt at state rescaling under conditions of neoliberalism, changing the landscape of immigration politics. Guiraudon and Lahav (2000), referring to developments in the European Union, have argued similarly that the migration functions of the nation-state are increasingly being shifted “up, down, and out” to supranational, subnational and non-state actors. Over an extended period state power and institutions – and thus the state itself – are being rescaled, and as Bob Jessop notes;

The new political economy of scale does not involve a pre-given set of places, spaces or scales that are merely being reordered. Instead, new places are emerging, new spaces are being created, new scales of organization are being developed and new horizons of action are being imagined. (Jessop, 2002, 179; see also Brenner, 2000, 2004; Peck, 2002)

(Re)inserting politics and agency into discussions of state rescaling and political economic restructuring, Jamie Peck (2001, 447) reminds us that, globalisation and neoliberalism “are not naturally occurring, inevitable consequences of the way the world works. Instead, they are part of a sustained political project which is explicitly concerned to normalise and naturalise conditions such as free trade, flexible labour, public-sector austerity, and low inflation”. Geographical scales are also reshaped and reconfigured, taking on new meanings (Sassen, 1991, Scott and Soja, 1997). Thus research that further explores the role of city governments and its inhabitants, including migrants, at multiple scales, is needed. And thinking of another possible, “perforated and topologically deformed” city and activism, borrowing from Giorgio Agamben, “it is only in a land where the spaces of states will have been perforated and topologically deformed, and the citizen will have learned to acknowledge the refugee that he himself is, that man's political survival today is imaginable” (Agamben, 1995).

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